Bismarck by Volker Ullrich

Author:Volker Ullrich
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Bismarck
ISBN: 9781910376249
Publisher: Haus Publishing
Published: 2015-05-20T00:00:00+00:00

Consolidation and preservation 1871–85

The creation of the ‘Lesser German’ and ‘Greater Prussian’ German national state led to unease throughout Europe, even where the process of unification had at first been followed with sympathetic but distant interest, as in England. The formation of a new and powerful state in the middle of the continent shook the traditional European balance to the core. Worse still, the new German Reich that had been baptised at Versailles seemed to be about to try and take on a hegemonic role. Bismarck was conscious that he could only allay such fears by strictly limiting the aims of German foreign policy and renouncing all further territorial claims. He could only hope that other states would gradually become reconciled to the existence of the Reich if he declared it to be ‘saturated’; in February 1874 he made a typical assurance: Our policy is one of security and not of power.192 To be sure, after 1871 the founder of the Reich did not turn overnight into a consistently peaceful leader, as the Bismarck orthodoxy long asserted. Rather, his diplomacy in the early 1870s was characterised by a degree of uncertainty as to the best ways and means. Bismarck needed to go through a learning process to adapt to the unaccustomed role of self-moderation.

He of course strove incessantly to weaken and isolate republican France to such an extent that it could never pose a threat to Germany; after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the permanent enmity of the French was to be expected. To this end Bismarck sought to strengthen the traditionally friendly links with Russia while at the same time normalising relations with Austria. It became one of the basic principles of his foreign policy to retain good relations with both powers without having to opt for one or the other. In the so-called ‘League of Three Emperors’ in October 1873, the three countries agreed to act jointly to preserve peace in Europe. However, the fragility of this agreement soon showed itself, in the ‘War in Sight’ crisis of spring 1875, which Bismarck himself provoked, highly alarmed as he was by developments in foreign policy since 1874. France had recovered from the war with unexpected rapidity, and prepared to make itself once more a force to be reckoned with among the Great Powers. At the same time there were disquieting indications that Russian diplomacy was putting out feelers to the Quai d’Orsay. For the first time, the Chancellor of the Reich was confronted with the nightmare possibility of a Franco-Russian coalition, a nightmare that was not to leave him for the rest of his time in office. To be sure, Bismarck did not intend to let loose another war. At the beginning of April 1875, he unfolded a press campaign intended to put France firmly in its place; at the same time he wanted to test the reactions of the other powers to see how much political room for manoeuvre was available to Germany.

This time, however, Bismarck had overplayed his hand.

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